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Criminal Case Complexity: 
An Empirical Perspective
Michael Heise*
Criminal case complexity persists as a central tenet in many aca-
demic and public critiques of our legal system even though little is
known about two critical questions. One question is whether key
actors (juries, attorneys, and judges) view case complexity similarly.
In other words, do juries, attorneys, and judges agree on whether a
case is complex? A second question involves the determinants of
case complexity for each group. That is, what factors make a case
more (or less) complex for juries, attorneys, and judges. This article
explores both questions from an empirical perspective with the
benefit of recent data from four jurisdictions. The data are impor-
tant because, within the context of criminal cases, they permit analy-
ses of agreement levels among the three key actors. Results suggest
that the three sets of actors possess slightly different views on
whether cases are complex. Judges reported the lowest levels of case
complexity; jurors the highest. Moreover, important variation exists
in terms of what made cases complex for each group. The results
implicate legal reform efforts. No clear consensus exists among the
critical actors on complexity perceptions. Many of the variables that
influence case complexity fall outside of reformers’ reach. Variables
within the reach of policy do not appear to systematically reduce
case complexity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jury’s capacity to mete out justice fairly and responsibly in complex crim-
inal trials has been on trial for more than a decade.1 Two distinct though
related trends fuel questions about jury capacity and position case com-
plexity on important law reform terrain. First, prevailing wisdom holds that
cases coming to trial for resolution are increasingly complex.2 Second, a
general and growing unease persists regarding a jury’s ability to render fair
and responsible decisions in complex cases.3 Because these two trends inter-
sect with regularity, legal reformers increasingly advance case complexity as
one rationale for reducing the justice system’s reliance on juries and for 
considering alternative adjudicative models.4
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1See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21
Yale J. Int’l L. 123, 181 (1996) (noting the need for broad reforms for complex criminal trials);
Neil Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury?, 80 Judicature 286 (1997)
(arguing that any criminal jury reforms should not rest on misperceptions of jury acquittal
rates). For more general discussions of civil and criminal cases, see Richard Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System
181, 235 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (noting the enduring call for jury reform); Peter H.
Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 306
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (“Calls to reform the jury abound.”); Jeffrey Abramson, We, The
Jury 3 (1994) (describing how the gap between the complexity of modern litigation and jurors’
qualifications “has widened to frightening proportions”); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod,
Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of its Meaning and its Effects, 18 L. & Hum. Behav. 29,
29 (1994) (noting that the “jury has been accused of being unfit to render fair and rational
decisions in complex litigation”). Others advance even broader critiques against civil juries that
include noncomplex cases. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Juries
Decide 241 (2002) (arguing that jurors produce “unreliable, erratic, and unpredictable”
results).
2See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials,
40 Am. U. L. Rev. 727, 728–29 (1991) (noting “increased complexity of issues presented for
adjudication”); Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 66
(2001) (same). See also Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee 97 (April 2, 1990) (recommending a review of how courts handle increased
scientific and technological complexity in litigation).
3See sources cited supra note 1. Concerns about jury capacity extend into popular American
culture. Mark Twain once remarked that a trial by jury “would prove the most ingenious 
and infallible agency for defeating justice that human wisdom could contrive.” Mark Twain, 2
Roughing It 320 (Harriet E. Smith & Edgar M. Branch eds., 1993) (emphasis in original).
4Schuck, supra note 1, at 327–28 (discussing diverting more civil cases to nonjury forums).
Criminal case complexity persists as a central tenet in many academic
and public critiques of the American legal system in general and its reliance
on juries in particular, even though little is known about two critical ques-
tions. One question is whether the key actors view case complexity similarly.
More specifically, do juries, attorneys, and judges agree on which cases they
find complex? A second question involves the determinants of case com-
plexity for each group. That is, what are the factors that make a case com-
plicated for a jury, an attorney, or a judge? This article explores both
questions from an empirical perspective with the benefit of recent data.
Although findings from this study do not provide dispositive conclusions on
how the American legal system should adjust—if at all—to complex cases,
data-driven analyses of these questions should inform legal and policy 
discussions.
Two general findings emerge from this study. First, even when 
assessing the same case, different participants in a legal trial viewed case 
complexity differently. In general, judges reported the lowest levels of 
complexity, jurors the highest, and attorneys’ perceptions of case complex-
ity typically fell somewhere in the middle of the continuum. Second, differ-
ent factors made cases complex for different groups. Both of these general
findings have important implications for policymakers endeavoring to
improve the quality of justice by making adjustments to the jury system for
especially complicated cases. The absence of a consensus of perceptions
about case complexity impedes reform efforts, which typically assume that
all participants view case complexity similarly. Moreover, most variables that
influence complexity are outside policymakers’ reach. Further, the efficacy
of those variables amenable to policy manipulation—such as jury-assistance
measures—remains uncertain.
Part II of this article considers the sources for the persistent concern
over case complexity, with particular attention to case complexity’s role in a
general critique of the American jury system. Part III describes the hypothe-
ses and the data and methodology used to test them. Part IV assesses case
complexity perceptions and agreement levels among juries, attorneys, and
judges. Part V presents the results of analyses of the different groups’ views
of case complexity. Part VI discusses the major themes that emerge from the
analyses as well as their implications for legal reform. A concluding section
identifies possible lines of future research.
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II. CONCERNS ABOUT CASE COMPLEXITY
Concerns continue to mount about complex cases’ implications for the
administration of justice. After initially describing the main sources of
anxiety over complex cases, I briefly describe the major reform efforts
designed to blunt complexity’s ill effects.
A. Sources of Anxiety
Cases typically become complex either because the evidence required is
technical or difficult to obtain, because the procedural context or relevant
legal rules are muddled, or because aspects of the trial itself generate diffi-
culties.5 Regardless of the precise reasons for complex cases, two factors help
explain persistent concerns about problems flowing from them. One factor
involves the widely shared perception that case complexity has increased
over time.6 Commentators note in particular that the “absolute number of
hard cases has increased.”7 In the criminal context, the use of forensic evi-
dence contributes to this increase.8 Because “hard” (or complex) cases fre-
quently involve mass torts and are tried in federal courts, they often attract
public attention. The disproportionate public attention to complex cases
helps explain the public perception that courts increasingly confront more
complicated cases. Whether public perceptions about case complexity trends
are correct is an empirical question that warrants careful study.9 Current
support for the public perceptions about case complexity trends is largely
impressionistic because existing evidence precludes firm conclusions about
whether case complexity has indeed increased over time.
A comparison of two independent data sets involving criminal trials
offers one clue—albeit limited and indirect—about complexity trends over
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5Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empir-
ical Study, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 27, 37 (2004).
6See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversar-
ial Processes, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 355, 358–59 (1998) (noting that the veritable explosion in the
use of experts implicitly suggests that cases are increasingly complex).
8See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 124–25.
9Such an investigation is beyond the scope of this study.
time. In their influential study of criminal trials during the 1950s, Professors
Kalven and Zeisel surveyed judges’ perceptions of case complexity (or “dif-
ficulty”).10 A more recent data set generated by the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC) similarly surveyed judges in criminal cases that concluded
during 2000–2001.11 A comparison of findings from both studies, presented
in Table 1, suggests two salient points.
First, Kalven and Zeisel observed that “the great bulk of [criminal]
cases are routine as to comprehension and hence unlikely to be misunder-
stood.”12 The Kalven and Zeisel data in Column 1 of Table 1 support their
observation. Judges in the vast majority of cases (86 percent) described the
cases as “easy to comprehend.”13 With the Kalven and Zeisel findings serving
as a crude baseline, a comparison with the NCSC data reveals a shift to a
perception of more complex criminal cases between the 1950s and 2000.
Although prudent inferences from this comparative snapshot of judges’ case
complexity perceptions are limited, the shift’s magnitude and direction are
probative and comport with prevailing wisdom.
Second, despite hinting at a trend toward more complex criminal cases
over time, the Kalven and Zeisel and the NCSC data sets share one trait.
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10Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 154 (1966).
11For a description of these data, see discussion infra Part III.B.
12Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 10, at 154.
13Id. at 153–54.
Table 1: Case Complexity Trends Over Time: Judges’ 
Perceptions (Percentage)
1 2
Kalven & Zeisel NCSC
Easy to comprehend 86 49.3
Somewhat complex 12 43.1
Very complex 2 7.6
N 1,191 355
NOTE: To facilitate comparisons across the Kalven and Zeisel (Column 1) and NCSC (Column
2) data sets, responses in the NCSC data set were recoded from their original seven-point Likert
scale to the three-point Kalven and Zeisel scale.
SOURCES: Column 1 is based on the Kalven and Zeisel data (Sample II) covering trials in
1954–1955 and 1958. Column 2 is based on NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
Specifically, as Column 2 of Table 1 demonstrates, judges in 2000 and 2001—
similar to their counterparts in the 1950s—perceived the highest number of
criminal cases as “easy to comprehend” and the lowest number of cases as
“very complex.” More importantly, however, is that after approximately 50
years, judges characterized more cases overall as “very complex.”
A second concern about increasingly complex cases is how they inter-
act with certain structural components of the American legal system, which
might aggravate the risks posed by case complexity. Procedural mechanisms
designed to facilitate fair trials may concomitantly increase the probability
that a jury might not fully understand a complicated case. Voir dire can
operate in a way that helps ensure that potential jurors wholly unaware of a
particular case stand a better chance of empanelment than potential jurors
with some understanding of the case (as well as excluding any juror with an
interest or opinion about the case).14 In addition to juries’ general lack of
experience, expertise, or specialization, Professor Schuck notes other prob-
lems that flow from systematically denying juries information about deci-
sions made by prior juries in similar cases.15
B. Case Complexity Reforms
Growing perceptions that cases are increasingly complex and that the Amer-
ican legal system structurally tilts in a direction that favors juries with com-
paratively less case-specific expertise shape recommendations for legal
reforms. Although much of the scholarly attention focuses on civil trials,
criminal trial reforms receive ample attention as well. Much of the related
scholarship dwells on how to help juries assimilate complex evidence and
does not distinguish between the civil and criminal settings. Although the
intellectual literature that frames this study sometimes conflates civil and
criminal contexts, the data in this study flow from and, therefore, speak to
only criminal trials.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide one important framework 
that structures the form and substance of information flowing to juries in
336 Criminal Case Complexity
14Stephen J. Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the Right to a
Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 537, 567–68 (1996) (noting that jury critics argue that voir dire helps
ensure that jurors finally selected by the court generally lack the capacity to deal with compli-
cated criminal cases); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age
of Mass Media?, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 631, 632–35 (1991) (same).
15For a discussion of these problems, see Schuck, supra note 1, at 311–12.
trials.16 First, Rule 702 permits a qualified expert to testify at trials to help
explain complex evidence.17 Second, Rule 403 allows a judge to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence if its threat of unfair prejudice or confusion for
the jury substantially outweighs its probative value.18 Both rules shape what
information juries receive and how they receive it in a criminal trial. At 
a more practical level, various jurisdictions now experiment with jury-
assistance mechanisms, including permitting jurors to take written notes
throughout a trial.19
At a more general level, another common reform theme is to direct
more cases away from juries and toward either judges or specialized juries
for resolution. Within this theme, two discrete suggestions predominate.
One suggestion retains the jury system but incorporates a “complexity excep-
tion,” relieving juries from especially complex cases on a judge-determined
ad hoc basis. A second method formally predetermines discrete areas of
complicated litigation and develops alternative mechanisms to handle such
cases.
1. Case Complexity Exception
Circuit courts split on whether judges possess the discretionary authority to
disallow jury trials where a presiding judge determines that the case is simply
too complicated to be entrusted to a jury. In In re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation,20 the Third Circuit concluded that due process concerns
stemming from an exceptionally complex antitrust case can justify a judge’s
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16The Federal Rules of Evidence only bind federal trials and have done so since 1975. Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. A number of states, however, have voluntarily
adopted the Federal Rules. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 128 n.19.
17Fed. R. Evid. 702.
18Fed. R. Evid. 403.
19See Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Deci-
sion Making, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 259 (1997) (discussing jury note-taking proposals).
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has advocated juror note taking as a key component of effective
reform. Sandra Day O’Connor, Juries: They May Be Broken, But We Can Fix Them, 44 Fed.
Law. 20, 24 (Jun. 1997).
20631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
decision to override a litigant’s right to a jury trial.21 The court construed
due process requirements to include a reasonable expectation that the jury
will be able to understand the facts and to apply the relevant legal princi-
ples.22 More abstractly, the Third Circuit concluded that the Seventh Amend-
ment23 must give way to the Fifth Amendment24 where a direct conflict
arises.25
Other circuit courts rejected the complexity exception. The Ninth
Circuit, in In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation,26 declined to interpret the
Seventh Amendment to permit exceptions, even in complicated cases.
Instead, the court’s language made clear its sentiment that lawyers and
judges carry the burden to assist lay jurors in complex cases.27
The U.S. Supreme Court has only glided by the complexity exception
debate. The third of a three-prong test endeavoring to help courts divine
whether an issue is “legal” or equitable references the “practical abilities and
limitations of juries.”28 Although obviously not dispositive, the dicta hint at
the possibility of the Court finding some limitations on the right to a civil
jury trial.
2. Specialized Courts
The creation of specialized courts represents a second reform option 
aimed at minimizing problems posed by complex cases. Arguments for 
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21Id. at 1079, 1084–89.
22Id. (concluding that such an assumption fails when a jury cannot understand evidence and
legal rules).
23The Seventh Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “In [s]uits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” U.S.
Const. amend. VII.
24Specifically, the due process clause. U.S. Const. amend. V.
25In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 631 F.2d at 1084–85.
26609 F.2d 411, 431–32 (9th Cir. 1979).
27Id. at 429–30. Interestingly, the court acknowledged a critical comparative point when it
expressly rejected the implicit point that “a single judge is brighter than the jurors collectively
functioning together.” Id at 431.
28Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
specialized courts to hear complex cases (frequently cast in terms of 
scientific complexity) have been made for over a century.29 Momentum 
for the development of specialized courts increased during the 20th century.
Efficiency- and expertise-based arguments helped justify the creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982.30 For some commen-
tators, however, even this specialized appeals court is not enough to handle
patent cases. Recent arguments, focusing on the particularly complicated
fact finding required in the patent area (frequently involving scientific or
engineering facts), advance a case for a specialized trial court for patent
issues.31
Various discussions about how to modify the legal system to accom-
modate increasingly complex cases coalesce around an impulse to reduce
the jury’s role. The tendency to focus on juries has some empirical founda-
tion as one study found that increased case complexity increased the prob-
ability of a hung jury.32 On balance, however, this impulse runs against the
weight of existing (though incomplete) empirical evidence suggesting that
what is known about juries’ ability to handle complex cases is, in general,
reassuring. Importantly, judges and juries typically agree on the outcome of
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29See, e.g., Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 55–58 (1901) (arguing that specialized adjudicators are better equipped
to decide specialized cases).
30See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant 
provisions codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.). See also Kimberly A. Moore,
Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev.
889, 932–34 (2000); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization
in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 765, 787–88 (2000); Arti K. Rai, Spe-
cialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 877, 878 (2002).
It bears noting, however, that the Federal Circuit bench hears an array of nonpatent cases. For
a description of its peculiar jurisdiction, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1989). For a discussion of patent and non-
patent caseloads, see Craig A. Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Houston L. Rev. 667, 678–81
(2002).
31See, e.g., Rai, supra note 30, at 878–80 (arguing on efficiency grounds for the creation of a
patent trial court with fact-finding responsibilities); Moore, supra note 30, at 932–34 (same).
32See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor et al., National Institute of Justice, Are Hung Juries a Problem?
45 (Sept. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at <http://www.ncesonline.org/wc/
publications/res_juries_hungjuriespub.pdf>.
cases.33 Where they disagree, case complexity does not increase the proba-
bility of disagreement.34 (Of course, the mere existence of judge-jury dis-
agreement does not necessarily mean that jurors were wrong and judges
were right.35) Also notable is that the resolutions of complex cases are not
skewed in a direction favoring plaintiffs or defendants.36 Complementing the
empirical studies are qualitative studies that echo the proposition that jury
decisions, even in complex cases, do not systematically violate litigants’ due
process rights.37 Ironically, the group dynamics of jury deliberations and the
leadership exerted by more knowledgeable jurors helped reduce problems
flowing from less knowledgeable jurors.38
An often overlooked aspect in many debates about jury capacity in
complex trials is that assessments of jury competence are necessarily com-
parative in nature. Even if juries are unable to consistently mete out justice
in a rational, coherent fashion in complicated cases, a conclusion to move
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33See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 10, at 58–64 & tbls. 12, 16 (noting judge-jury agreement in
criminal and civil cases). See also Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 117, 129
(1986) (discussing jury efficacy).
34See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 
909, 924–26 (2002) (summarizing empirical literature on judge-jury agreement rates in
complex cases). See generally Sanders, supra note 7, at 360–67 (reviewing studies of jury 
competence); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial
Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author) (June 1, 2003).
35See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 33, at 129 (concluding that judge-jury disagreement does not
necessarily indicate jury incompetence).
36See Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?,
62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 739, 748 (1992) (finding that jurors in experimental simula-
tions are reluctant to favor plaintiffs who rely exclusively on probabilistic evidence). But see
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1137, 1174 (1992) (finding that trials jurors were harder on plaintiffs
than judges were).
37See Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases, in Verdict, supra note 1, 85–88, 205 & tbl. 6-1.
Professor Lempert appropriately cautions readers against drawing firm conclusions from his
nonrandom, qualitative study of 13 civil and criminal cases. Id. at 205.
38Peters, supra note 34, at 928. But cf. Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for
Complex Litigation, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 49, 55 (1997) (summarizing studies finding jury confu-
sion in complex cases).
away from jury and to bench trials makes sense only if judges can decide
complicated cases more rationally, consistently, and coherently than can
juries.39 Clearly, some—if not many—judges feel they are better equipped
than lay juries to decide complex cases fairly.40
Not all agree, however, that judges are comparatively superior adjudi-
cators of complex cases. As Professor Lempert notes, not all judges are
“bright and diligent,” and, unlike juries, they do not benefit from collective
recall.41 Despite some judges’ confidence in their comparative superiority,
firm answers to this and other empirical questions are not known. Indeed,
surprisingly little is known about what makes a case complex in the eyes of
juries, attorneys, and judges.
III. HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
I begin this part by describing my research hypotheses and then the data
and methodology used to test them.
A. Hypotheses
Two general questions shape the research hypotheses. I first consider
whether the three groups of key actors in a trial—juries, attorneys, and
judges—perceive criminal case complexity differently. I then turn to actor-
specific complexity models to assess how three types of factors influence case
complexity for each group.
1. Conventional wisdom suggests that juries are less equipped than
judges (or other specialists) to navigate through complex legal
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39Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases, in Verdict, supra note 1, at 214; Schuck, supra note
1, at 309–10 (noting that judges possess biases as well); Sanders, supra note 7, at 361 (noting
that jury competence studies do not make clear whether other factfinders would perform
better).
40For example, Judge Jerome Frank wrote in a judicial opinion that “the jury . . . has infinite
capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the
judge can explain in an hour.” See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.
1948). See also Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial 108–25 (1949).
41Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 80 Mich.
L. Rev. 68, 90–91 (1981). See also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1989, at 205 (noting that the jury system’s advantages over
bench trials include its number and its interaction).
cases.42 The prevailing sentiment that judges and juries disagree on
complexity perceptions persists even though judges and juries sub-
stantially agree on case outcomes.43 Consistent with the received
thought, I hypothesize that juries will report higher complexity
levels than their legally trained counterparts (judges and attorneys).
Further, as between judges and attorneys, I expect that judges will
report lower levels of case complexity due to their greater exposure
to and familiarity with the criminal justice system.
2. The three different types of factors analyzed in this study are either
designed or presumed to influence case complexity differently or
are included as control variables. I hypothesize that individual-level
factors will not significantly influence case complexity. In contrast,
I expect that certain case- and reform-level factors will influence
case complexity, though in different directions. For example, such
case-level factors as trial length and more difficult evidence will
increase complexity. I anticipate that reform-level factors, including
juries’ ability to submit written questions and to use notebooks, will
accomplish what reformers set out to achieve—case complexity
reduction. Finally, I hypothesize that the three types of factors will
influence juries, attorneys, and judges similarly.
B. Data and Methodology
This study draws on the NCSC data set developed for its study on hung juries.
The NCSC report, Are Hung Juries A Problem?44 and other publications45
contain thorough descriptions of the data. What follows is a brief summary.
Data on criminal trials in four sites (Los Angeles, Phoenix, the Bronx,
and the District of Columbia) were gathered during 2000 and 2001. These
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42See Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/
Medical Issues?: Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 Emory L.J. 885, 885–88 (1994)
(describing various critiques of the jury system).
43Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement, supra note 34, at 1. Interestingly, where disagreement
exists, it distributes asymmetrically. Id.
44See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 36.
45See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials in Four Major Metro-
politan Jurisdictions, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2004); Eisenberg et al., Judge-
Jury Agreement, supra note 34.
sites were selected due to their relatively high volume of felony criminal jury
trials and willingness to devote court personnel to data-gathering tasks.46
Many of the questions—including those involving case complexity—asked
participants to give ratings on a standard seven-point Likert scale. In
response, 91 percent of the judges surveyed returned the questionnaire. At
least one attorney responded in 88 percent of the cases; the lead prosecu-
tor and defense lawyer both responded in 64 percent of the cases. After slight
adjustments owing to the different jurisdictions’ jury sizes, the overall juror
response rate was 80 percent.47 Those few respondents in each category who
failed to report information on the dependent variable of interest—case
complexity—were excluded from the sample.48 Table 2 summarizes final
usable responses, by site and respondent group.
Survey instruments administered to the participating jurors, judges,
and attorneys collected a range of information in three discrete areas. An
array of individual-level data, including standard demographic information,
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46Some site-specific aspects played a role as well. Two sites (Los Angeles and Washington, DC)
were selected due to reported concerns about hung juries. Arizona’s procedure that permits
further evidence and argument where a jury reports that it is deadlocked made Phoenix espe-
cially attractive. See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 29.
47See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 32.
48For example, three of the 358 responding judges failed to report information on case 
complexity. Id. at 32–33.
Table 2: Summary of Participant Data*
Bronx DC LA Phoenix N
Jury 91 94 101 96 382
Judge 93 92 82 88 355
Defense attorney 73 72 62 72 279
Prosecutor 72 63 65 74 274
N 329 321 310 330 1,290
*Twenty-eight cases involved more than one defendant. In those rare instances, to minimize
data coding complexity issues, I excluded consideration of all but the first-named defendant.
The exclusion did not materially influence the results. It does explain, however, why, in a few
instances, slight variations exist between cell counts in my Table 1 and Table 3.1 in the NCSC
report. Compare Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 33 tbl. 3.1.
NOTE: The number of juries indicates those cases in which information from at least one
member of the jury was received. The 382 juries included 3,428 individual jurors.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
experience, and perceptions of other actors’ performance or skill levels,
were gathered from juries, attorneys, and judges. Also, case-level data con-
taining information on case and trial characteristics, including location and
case types, were gathered from participating courts. Finally, additional case-
level information relating to jury reform efforts—specifically, jury-assistance
mechanisms—were collected. Matching individual- and case-level data per-
mitted analyses across all three groups of actors within individual cases.
Descriptive summary data, presented in Table 3, hint at two major
themes. First, judges perceived the cases as the least complex; juries as the
most complex. Second, the two groups of attorneys—defense attorneys and
prosecutors—perceived case complexity almost identically.
The NCSC data possess considerable strengths. Notably, they are
perhaps the only major, large-scale collection of cross-sectional data for case
complexity studies. Unlike the Kalven and Zeisel study, which gathered case
complexity perceptions only from judges, the NCSC data include case com-
plexity reports from all the critical legal actors: juries, attorneys, and judges.
Consequently, the NCSC data permit rich comparisons among juries, attor-
neys, and judges, as well as possible variations among these groups within a
specific case. The result is a more textured picture of case complexity.
Notwithstanding their many virtues, the NCSC data contain important
limitations. One potential problem is that how respondents’ construed the
term “case complexity” likely varied not only across the three groups but
within each group as well.49 Where some respondents may have construed
as “complex” cases that involved substantively complicated subject matter
(e.g., murder cases involving contested expert testimony on the interpreta-
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49See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 1, at 35 (noting that judges construe
case complexity in terms of evidentiary and legal complexity); Nicole L. Mott, How Civil Jurors
Cope with Complexity: Defining the Issues 18–21 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ.
of Delaware) (on file with author).
Table 3: Summary of Case Complexity by Participant
Mean SD N
Jury 3.71 1.24 367
Judge 2.87 1.57 355
Defense attorney 3.24 1.58 273
Prosecutor 3.22 1.51 273
NOTE: Respondents were asked to rank case complexity on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1
representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.”
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
tion of DNA results) or procedural issues, other respondents, in contrast,
may have characterized as “complex” a straightforward assault case that
involved an exceptionally “close” decision about facts or law. Still others may
have construed complexity in terms of the sheer volume of information pre-
sented or trial length.
Although variation in how juries, attorneys, and judges understand
case complexity poses obvious analytical challenges, such variation might be
expected. After all, each of the three groups performs a distinct, though
complementary, role in a criminal trial. Judges, typically the most experi-
enced participants in most criminal trials, assume responsibility for over-
seeing and managing trials and resolving questions of law. Juries, by contrast,
although usually inexperienced with criminal processes and unlikely to have
received formal legal training, handle critical fact-finding duties. Finally, the
attorneys are obligated to pursue their clients’ legal interests zealously. These
distinct roles shape juries’, judges’, and attorneys’ perspectives. These dis-
tinct perspectives might generate different understandings and interpreta-
tions of case complexity.
Whether case complexity perceptions systematically varied among the
four sites raises further questions. Moreover, as Professor Eisenberg and his
co-authors note, the NCSC data were gathered from a legal environment
that continues to evolve over time.50 Compared to the influential Kalven and
Zeisel study of the 1950s, by 2000, juries had become more representative
of the communities they served. Although the composition of the judiciary
similarly evolved over time, changes in the jury composition are likely to
have been far greater. Finally, while the list of relevant independent variables
for juries is ample, the list for judges and attorneys is comparatively less so.
IV. CRIMINAL CASE COMPLEXITY: PERCEPTIONS
AND AGREEMENT
The initial task is to examine whether criminal case complexity perceptions
varied as predicted among juries, attorneys, and judges. The analysis
includes three parts. I first explore aggregate case complexity reports across
all cases. I then examine case complexity variations within individual cases.
To accomplish this I match various pairs of actors within a case, assess
whether their complexity reports about the same case differ, compute the
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50See, e.g., Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement, supra note 34, at 5.
differences, if any, and present the resulting distributions. Finally, I analyze
whether these distributions systematically vary from one another.
A. Aggregate Case Complexity Reports
Aggregate case complexity reports, presented in Figure 1, map the initial
contours of how juries, attorneys, and judges perceived complexity. The hor-
izontal axis, presenting the seven-point Likert scale (where 1 is “not at all
complex” and 7 is “very complex”), illustrates a convergence on one extreme
(few perceived cases as “very complex”), but not on the other. The com-
paratively few juries that perceived cases as “not at all complex” contrasts
sharply with the high number of judges and attorneys who perceived more
than 20 percent and more than 10 percent of the cases as “not at all
complex,” respectively. Although disagreements exist on the “not at all
complex” side of the Likert scale, the “very complex” side conveys general
agreement. That is to say, very few juries, attorneys, and judges rated cases
as “very complex.”
B. Differences in Case Complexity Reports Within Individual Cases
One critical question is whether juries, attorneys, and judges perceive case
complexity similarly when viewing the same case. To assess this, complexity
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Figure 1: Case complexity, by party and percent of cases.
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NOTE: Respondents were asked to rank case complexity on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1
representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Judge N = 355; Jury 
N = 367; Defense Attorney N = 273; and Prosecutor N = 273.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
perception agreement scores were computed for various pairs of actors. The
resulting scores, presented in Figure 2, comport with the findings in Figure
1. Although the means for all four distributions are negative, the judge-jury
difference mean is the most pronounced (–0.87).51 Means for the judge-
prosecutor difference and judge-defense attorney difference are –0.41 and
–0.46, respectively. The defense attorney-prosecutor mean difference is the
least pronounced and, indeed, just barely negative (–0.06).
The paired-differences distributional means show how judge-jury dif-
ferences are distinct from differences between the judges and attorneys as
well as differences between the opposing attorneys. Moreover, judge-
attorney differences exceed defense attorney-prosecutor differences but fall
far short of the judge-jury difference. Also notable is the general similarity
in how judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors perceive case complexity.
Finally, prosecutors and defense attorneys virtually agreed in their assess-
ments of case complexity.
Heise 347
51The expected difference is negative because I computed the difference by subtracting a jury’s
reported complexity level from a judge’s. The overall negative tilt in Figure 2 emerges because
judges typically perceived a case as less complex than the jury did. See Figure 1.
Figure 2: Differences in complexity perceptions, by pairs of parties.
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NOTE: Respondents were asked to rank case complexity on a seven-point Likert scale, with 1
representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Case complexity differ-
ences were computed by subtracting paired differences for each case. Judge N = 355; Jury N =
367; Defense Attorney N = 273; and Prosecutor N = 273. A difference of “0” would indicate that
the respondents viewed case complexity identically.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
C. Variation in Perception Differences
A related question is whether the paired-differences distributions, presented
in Figure 2, systematically vary from one another.52 Additional summary sta-
tistics supply further evidence. Table 4 presents results from a nonparamet-
ric two-sample Wilcoxon test and suggests three main findings. First, and
most importantly, the distribution of the judge-jury differences (Row 1) sys-
tematically differs from the distributions of all other paired combinations.53
This finding reflects the magnitude of the difference in case complexity per-
ceptions between judges and juries. Second, the distribution of defense
attorney-prosecutor differences (Column E) also systematically departs from
almost every other pairing. In contrast to the judge-jury finding, the defense
attorney-prosecutor finding emerges due to a comparative absence of sharp
disagreement. That is, unlike other pairings, defense attorneys and prose-
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52Despite the distributions’ symmetric appearance, benign skewness and kurtosis analyses, 
and plots that are at least suggestive that the groups distribute normally, results from the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test preclude rejecting the possibility that they are not normally dis-
tributed. Therefore, to be cautious, I used a nonparametric test, specifically, the nonparamet-
ric two-sample Wilcoxon test, rather than the t-test.
53In an effort to ease interprability, reduce figure “clutter,” and increase focus on the critical
relations, Figure 2 presents data from a nonexhaustive list of possible pairings. In an effort to
be thorough, Table 4 presents a results matrix that includes all potential pairings. The general
trend hinted at in Figure 2 comes through with more force (and complexity) in Table 4.
Table 4: Differences in Complexity Perceptions, by Pairs
A B C D E
Judge- Judge- Defense Prosecutor- Defense
Defense Prosecutor Attorney- Jury Attorney-
Attorney Jury Prosecutor
1. Judge-jury -5.05** -4.18** -4.25** -4.40** -5.66**
2. Judge-defense attorney — -0.45 -0.40 -0.28 -1.98*
3. Judge-prosecutor — -0.28 -0.22 -3.81**
4. Defense attorney-jury — -0.79 -3.54**
5. Prosecutor-jury — -1.66
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
NOTE: This table presents a matrix of the various paired-difference combinations. The non-
parametric two-sample Wilcoxon test was used due to concerns about whether the paired dif-
ferences distributed normally.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
cutors perceived case complexity similarly and that absence of difference dis-
tinguishes them from other pairs. Third, and predictably flowing from the
second finding, the distributional differences between judge-prosecutor and
judge-defense attorneys do not systematically differ. Overall, the findings
presented in Table 4 comport with and refine the patterns suggested in
Figures 1 and 2.
Cumulatively, these paired-difference distributional findings supple-
ment the contours of a case complexity continuum. The continuum sup-
ports my hypothesis and likely reflects the parties’ relative experiences with
and exposure to the criminal justice system.54 Judges occupy one end of the
case complexity continuum (perceiving the least case complexity), juries the
other end (perceiving the most case complexity), and defense attorneys and
prosecutors stake out something resembling a middle ground. Notably,
defense attorneys and prosecutors—who presumably resemble one another
in terms of experience with and exposure to the criminal justice system—
perceived case complexity similarly.
D. Possible Explanations for Complexity Perceptions Differences
Although it is clear that juries, attorneys, and judges perceived case com-
plexity somewhat differently, reasons for these differences and what to make
of them—if anything—are not as clear. The possibility of a scaling effect, the
three sets of actors’ different experience levels with the criminal justice
system, and that juries, attorneys, and judges are structurally designed to
accomplish different—albeit complementary—tasks might account for some
of the perception differences and potentially dampen their interpretative
importance.
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54Although for purposes of this analysis I assume away the possibility that some jurors might be
legally trained, it is almost certain that some of the 3,428 jurors in the sample benefited from
formal legal training. A precise count is not possible due to data limitations. What the data do
provide, however, is a basis for informed guesses. Among those jurors who provided current
occupation information, 28.4 percent described their positions as “professional.” Within the
range of options, those jurors practicing law (and, to be clear, only a subset of those with formal
legal training would be practicing law) would likely select that outcome. Of course, this label
is assuredly both over- and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in that plenty of jurors who
described their occupational status as “professional” are not practicing law and do not possess
formal legal training. The proxy is underinclusive because not everyone with legal training prac-
tices law or, for that matter, engages in a formal “professional” occupation. These limitations
notwithstanding, it is fair to assume that although almost every attorney and judge in the sample
benefits from formal legal training, it is difficult to imagine that more than one-quarter of the
jurors are legally trained.
The use of the seven-point Likert survey measure introduces the pos-
sibility of scaling differences. That is, an objectively complex case might rate
a 7 from a jury (denoting “very complex”) yet only a 6 from a judge due to
different applications of the seven-point Likert scale rather than to real dif-
ferences in complexity perceptions. Moreover, juries’, attorneys’, and judges’
varying experience with criminal trials and exposure to formal legal train-
ing might inform their respective complexity perceptions. Finally, as previ-
ously discussed, juries, attorneys, and judges perform, by design, distinct
tasks in criminal trials. Given their different roles and functions, one might
expect case complexity perceptions to vary among the three groups.
Further analyses call into some question the importance of observed
case complexity perception differences. I previously hypothesized that com-
parative experience with and exposure to the legal system helps account for
the finding that juries reported more case complexity than lawyers and that
lawyers reported more case complexity than judges. To use judges’ percep-
tions as a baseline, it follows that attorneys’ complexity perceptions should
explain more judicial complexity than jury complexity. To test this hypoth-
esis, judge case complexity was modeled as a function of jury, defense attor-
ney, and prosecutor case complexity reports.
Results from Table 5, however, do not support this hypothesis. In every
model variant except one (Column 2), juries did a better job than attorneys
in explaining judge complexity, even though judge-jury differences
exceeded judge-attorney differences. This suggests that, while the distribu-
tions of judge, attorney, and jury complexity reports varied, coherent expla-
nations of why they varied elude. Standing alone, these findings cast some
question on whether the observed complexity differences flow from objec-
tively different perceptions of case complexity or, rather, because different
groups internalized the seven-point Likert scale differently. Consequently,
inferences drawn from the observed distributional differences must be
drawn cautiously.
V. MODELING CRIMINAL CASE COMPLEXITY
Part IV indicates that the three major actors in the criminal trial context—
juries, attorneys, and judges—perceived case complexity somewhat differ-
ently, although what to make of the differences is unclear. Independent of
questions about case complexity agreement levels are questions about what
makes cases complicated for each group. An array of variables further influ-
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ences case complexity perceptions and the variables explored in this study
fall into one of three broad groups: individual-, case-, and reform-level vari-
ables.55 Shifting from univariate to multivariate analyses, my objective in this
part is two-fold. I first examine which factors influence case complexity for
each of the three groups and then assess whether differences emerge among
the groups.
Tables 6–8 report the results. Alternative model specifications for each
of the three groups are helpful and contribute additional texture and clarity
to an emerging picture of case complexity. As well, comparing findings from
the various model specifications illustrates the overall robustness and stabil-
ity of the core findings within each group and, in some instances, across
groups.
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55The variables do not have multicollinearity problems. For a general discussion of multi-
collinearity, see William D. Berry, Understanding Regression Assumptions (1993). Also, the
maximum variance inflation score (VIF) for any of the independent variables is well below 5.00,
the value that most conservative statisticians use to detect problems associated with multi-
collinearity. See David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death
Penalty: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 109, 121–22 n.12 (2002); see also John
Fox, Regression Diagnostics 10–13 & tbl. 3.1 (1991) (arguing that VIF scores need to exceed
anywhere from 5.0 to 10.0 before much damage is done to the precision of the estimate by 
multicollinearity).
Table 5: Regression Models of Judge Case Complexity
1 2 3 4 5 6
Evidentiary Evidentiary Legal Legal Overall Overall
Complexity Complexity Complexity Complexity Case Case
Complexity Complexity
Jury 0.35** 0.27** 0.53** 0.46** 0.47** 0.41**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Defense 0.27** — 0.27** — 0.28** —
attorney (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prosecutor — 0.34** — 0.30** — 0.32**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 0.22 0.37 -0.08 0.14 0.07 0.25
(0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.25)
R2 0.23 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.32
N 235 246 235 246 235 246
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
NOTE: Dependant variable = judge case complexity ranks using a seven-point Likert scale, with
1 representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Reanalyzing of all six
model variants using ordered logit generated materially similar results.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
A. Jury
Predictable and unpredictable findings, presented in Table 6, emerge from
jury case complexity models and provide mixed support for my hypotheses.
Predictably, cases involving death as well as cases involving difficult evidence
increased case complexity for juries. Also expected is that longer trials
(Column 2)56 correlated with increased complexity. The influence of trial
length makes sense in that more complex cases would typically involve more
witnesses—especially expert witnesses—needed to generate the factual foun-
dation for the judge and jury.
Less predictable was the influence of certain individual- and case-level
factors. African-American and lower-income juries perceived cases as less
complex; juries with prior experience perceived cases as more complex. The
influence of these jury background factors, however, is sensitive to trial
length (Column 2). Aside from the jury characteristic findings, other find-
ings in Table 6 are generally robust. Somewhat inexplicably, trials in the Dis-
trict of Columbia as well as trials where prosecutors were viewed as especially
skilled increased case complexity for juries. That skillful prosecutors
increased complexity surprises, because prosecutors typically try to convince
juries how “clear and easy” a case is against a defendant.
The jury complexity models are also notable for factors—particularly
reform-level factors—that did not emerge as significant. Although the coef-
ficients for two of the three jury-assistance variables point in the hypothe-
sized direction (negative), none achieve statistical significance. To be sure,
precious little can properly be inferred from the absence of statistical sig-
nificance.57 The prominence, however, that jury-assistance devices (such as
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56I report two separate models due to trial days’ interaction with other variables.
57A further technical word of caution is warranted with respect to interpreting a statistically
insignificant finding. The power of a statistical test is the likelihood of detecting an effect of 
a specific size at a specified significance level (here, the p < 0.05 level). If the test used is not
very powerful, the likelihood of detecting a statistical effect is diminished. Thus, perfectly
designed and executed studies may fail to detect socially important differences simply because
the sample sizes are too small to give the procedure enough power to detect the effect. Stanton
A. Glantz, Primer of Biostatistics 165 (5th ed. 2002). Therefore, it is important to consider a
test’s power when one claims that no significant effect has been detected. Here, however, my
sample size is large enough to reduce the potential that it accounts for the insignificant find-
ings regarding the jury-assistance variables. See also John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judi-
cial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev.
465, 491 n.83 (1999).
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Table 6: Regression Models of Jury Case Complexity Perceptions
1 2
Jury background
Age -0.03 0.01
(0.11) (0.11)
Experience 0.63* 0.52
(0.29) (0.30)
Income -0.16* -0.10
(0.08) (0.08)
Female 0.10 -0.18
(0.25) (0.27)
African-American -0.85* -0.54
(0.33) (0.35)
Hispanic -0.01 0.24
(0.34) (0.34)
Religious -0.06 -0.23
(0.12) (0.13)
Skill levels
Prosecutor skill 0.15* 0.13*
(0.05) (0.05)
Defense attorney skill 0.08 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Understood experts -0.02 -0.03
(0.08) (0.09)
Understood judge 0.04 0.10
(0.07) (0.07)
Trial background
Number of defendants -0.19 -0.12
(0.34) (0.36)
Number of victims 0.09 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of expert witnesses 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Prior hung trial -0.09 -0.08
(0.24) (0.24)
Number of trial days — 0.07**
(0.03)
Case type
Death 0.61* 0.57*
(0.26) (0.26)
Rape/sex offense 0.52 0.30
(0.31) (0.31)
Assault 0.13 -0.01
(0.24) (0.24)
Theft -0.06 -0.04
(0.23) (0.22)
DUI -0.19 -0.16
(0.33) (0.32)
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Table 6: Continued
1 2
Drugs -0.26 -0.15
(0.23) (0.22)
Weapons -0.19 0.01
(0.29) (0.29)
Location
Bronx 0.29 0.32
(0.24) (0.25)
DC 0.43* 0.44*
(0.19) (0.20)
Phoenix 0.13 0.25
(0.20) (0.21)
Evidence and law
Difficult evidence 0.66** 0.69**
(0.08) (0.08)
Law fair in this case 0.00 -0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Jury assistance
Notebook -0.04 -0.03
(0.14) (0.14)
Written jury instructions 0.04 0.04
(0.18) (0.18)
Jury permitted to submit written questions -0.13 -0.12
(0.16) (0.16)
Constant 1.23 0.98
(1.15) (1.17)
R2 0.57 0.61
N 280 256
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
NOTE: Dependent variable = jury case complexity ranks using a seven-point Likert scale, with
1 representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Standard errors in
parentheses. Los Angeles is the reference category for the location dummy variables.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
the allowance of notebooks and written questions from jurors) play in
current reform debates58 enhances the potential importance of this negative
finding.
58See Part II.B.
B. Attorney
Certain case-level factors influenced attorney case complexity perceptions.
As Table 7 makes clear, attorneys consistently found longer trials more com-
plicated. Closely related to the number of trial days, the total number of
expert witnesses presenting also corresponded with a trial’s complexity.
Retrying previously hung trials assisted prosecutors, who found such trials
less complex. The benefit of hindsight (as well as, perhaps, information
gleaned from juror polling59 and posttrial interviews) likely helped reduce
prosecutors’ perceptions of case complexity—presumably by helping iden-
tify reasons why the jury in the prior trial hung.
With two important exceptions, neither background nor location vari-
ables exerted much independent influence on attorneys’ perceptions of case
complexity. The two exceptions include attorney age and skill level. Specif-
ically, older prosecutors reported less case complexity as did, though to a
lesser extent, all attorneys (Column 2). Notably, the influence of attorney
age emerged independent of prior criminal case experience.
Variations in attorney skill levels influenced defense attorney case
complexity perceptions. Defense attorneys noted that especially skillful pros-
ecutors reduced case complexity (Columns 3 and 4), and, though to a lesser
extent (Column 3), skillful defense attorneys increased case complexity.
These findings cohere with conventional wisdom as well as defense attor-
neys’ and prosecutors’ dueling incentives. A defense attorney—seeking to
serve the defendant by gaining an acquittal (or hung jury)—need only per-
suade a jury that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is not met. One
tactic designed to achieve that goal is to impress a case’s complicating factors
upon a jury. Prosecutors, in contrast, need to demonstrate that no reason-
able doubt exists regarding a defendant’s guilt. To advance the state’s inter-
ests, a prosecutor usually emphasizes a case’s clarity and simplicity, at least
as it bears on the defendant’s guilt. Taken together, this suggests that defense
attorneys are inclined to complicate a case; prosecutors to simplify. If so, one
would expect to find that, in defense attorneys’ eyes, skillful opposing
counsel (prosecutors) reduced case complexity where skillful defense 
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59For example, federal criminal procedure rules permit jury polling. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d)
(noting that after a verdict is returned, but before the jury is dismissed, either party has the
right to request that the court poll the jurors).
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Table 7: Regression Models of Attorney Case Complexity Perceptions
1 2 3 4 5 6
All All Defense Defense Prosecutors Prosecutors
Attorneys Attorneys
Attorney background
Age -0.11 -0.19* 0.04 -0.03 -0.35* -0.40**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15)
Female -0.02 -0.09 -0.32 -0.43 0.25 0.15
(0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20) (0.20)
Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Own skill 0.11 0.06 0.20* 0.14 -0.02 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Opposing attorney -0.06 -0.09 -0.21* -0.22** -0.01 -0.04
skill (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Trial background
Number of 0.42 0.25 0.28 0.01 0.40 0.29
defendants (0.27) (0.27) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38)
Number of victims 0.20** 0.14* 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.16
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Number of expert 0.22** 0.14** 0.18** 0.12 0.20** 0.12
witnesses (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Prior hung trial -0.74* -0.63 -0.36 -0.33 -1.11* -1.01*
(0.34) (0.34) (0.51) (0.53) (0.47) (0.46)
Number of trial days — 0.17** — 0.19** — 0.14**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Case type
Death 0.77* 0.35 0.60 0.14 1.00* 0.66
(0.33) (0.33) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Rape/sex offense 0.62 0.41 0.69 0.74 0.80 0.50
(0.41) (0.40) (0.64) (0.62) (0.55) (0.55)
Assault 0.98** 0.95** 1.13* 1.08* 0.73 0.83
(0.32) (0.31) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Theft 0.35 0.44 0.14 0.34 0.30 0.29
(0.31) (0.30) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43)
DUI 0.90* 0.92* 0.54 0.62 1.06 1.04
(0.42) (0.41) (0.60) (0.58) (0.60) (0.58)
Drugs -0.42 -0.21 -0.54 -0.30 -0.54 -0.38
(0.31) (0.30) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42)
Weapons 0.11 0.31 -0.16 0.12 0.08 0.19
(0.40) (0.40) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57)
Location
Bronx 0.34 0.21 -0.18 -0.41 0.63 0.50
(0.26) (0.26) (0.42) (0.44) (0.35) (0.35)
DC 0.25 0.31 0.15 0.26 0.39 0.37
(0.20) (0.20) (0.32) (0.32) (0.27) (0.27)
Phoenix -0.19 0.05 -0.24 0.01 -0.23 -0.06
(0.24) (0.23) (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32)
attorneys increased case complexity.60 The findings involving defense 
attorneys generally support this logic.
If, as I argue above, defense attorneys are inclined to increase case com-
plexity and prosecutors are inclined to decrease case complexity, it would
follow that attorney skill levels should influence prosecutors just as they
influenced defense lawyers. Interestingly, however, unlike the findings
involving defense attorneys, attorney-skill-level variables did not significantly
influence prosecutors (Columns 5 and 6). What might explain these seem-
ingly asymmetrical findings? One possibility is that the findings involving
defense attorneys might be anomalistic, unreliable, or little more than a sta-
tistical artifact. Although plausible, an alternative explanation suggests why
we might not expect to observe symmetrical findings for defense attorneys
and prosecutors.
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60Whether the opposite is also true—that is, from the perspective of a prosecutor, a skillful 
prosecutor will reduce and a skilled defense attorney will increase case complexity—is a point
I discuss below.
Table 7: Continued
1 2 3 4 5 6
All All Defense Defense Prosecutors Prosecutors
Attorneys Attorneys
Jury assistance
Notebook 0.17 0.12 0.29 0.17 0.10 0.13
(0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24)
Written jury -0.25 -0.08 -0.64 -0.39 0.23 0.25
instructions (0.22) (0.23) (0.35) (0.36) (0.30) (0.30)
Jury permitted to -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.20 -0.11
submit written (0.22) (0.21) (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.28)
questions
Constant 2.07** 2.09** 2.53** 2.57* 2.76** 3.00**
(0.63) (0.63) (0.94) (0.99) (0.93) (0.92)
R2 0.29 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.33 0.38
N 414 392 200 188 208 198
*p < 0.05; **p < .01.
NOTE: Dependent variable = jury case complexity ranks using a seven-point Likert scale, with
1 representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Standard errors in
parentheses. Los Angeles is the reference category for the location dummy variables.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
Unlike defense attorneys, prosecutors represent public constituencies
and, therefore, possess a broader set of interests when they decide to bring
and to try cases.61 Prosecutorial discretion also informs prosecutors’ actions.
These and other considerations reduce the likelihood that prosecutors will
move forward in cases where the underlying facts supporting guilt are not
reasonably strong. Consequently, prosecutors’ comparatively greater preoc-
cupation with a case’s underlying factual basis might inform their percep-
tions about a case’s complexity far more than prosecutors’ perceptions about
their counterparts’ lawyering skills. To be sure, I do not suggest that either
defense attorneys or prosecutors do anything but zealously defend their
clients’ interests. Rather, my smaller point is simply that their respective
interests as advocates are not the exact reciprocal of one another. Thus, the
different contexts in which defense attorneys and prosecutors operate might
account for the finding that lawyers’ skill levels influenced case complexity
perceptions for defense attorneys but not necessarily for prosecutors.
Other case-level factors also influenced attorneys’ case complexity per-
ceptions. Not surprisingly, an increase in the number of expert witnesses
increased perceived case complexity. Notably, this influence persisted even
after including the trial length variable (Column 2). As well, attorneys found
certain types of cases—assault and drunk driving cases and, to a lesser extent,
cases involving death—more complicated than others. A closer examination
of the two subgroups of attorneys reveals important nuances and a less
robust influence of case types. For example, while defense attorneys found
assault cases especially complicated, prosecutors were more likely to identify
death cases as complex.
C. Judge
Unlike the survey instrument presented to jurors and attorneys, judges were
asked about their perceptions of complexity on two specific dimensions—
evidentiary and legal complexity. To facilitate comparisons across all three
groups of actors, I constructed an “overall” case complexity measure for
judges that blended the evidentiary and legal complexity measures. Table 8
presents results for all three measures. Results for both models for the three
dependent variables evidence substantial robustness and consistency.
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61See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 13.10.4, at 765 (1986) (“The most
striking difference between a prosecutor and a defense lawyer or any non-governmental lawyer
is that a prosecutor is much more constrained as an advocate.”).
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Table 8: Regression Models of Judge Case Complexity Perceptions
1 2 3 4 5 6
Evidence Evidence Legal Legal Case Case
Judge
Judge experience -0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
Prosecutor skill 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.13
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Defense attorney skill 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.20
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11)
Trial background
Number of 0.71* 0.54 1.15** 1.16** 1.87** 1.70**
defendants (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.52) (0.54)
Number of victims 0.19* 0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.22 -0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12)
Number of expert 0.18** 0.12 0.13* 0.08 0.32** 0.20
witnesses (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11)
Prior hung trial 0.07 0.25 -0.08 0.27 -0.01 0.52
(0.38) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40) (0.68) (0.70)
Number of trial days — 0.20** — 0.15** — 0.35**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Case type
Death 1.31** 0.84* 2.00** 1.68** 3.31** 2.51**
(0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.72) (0.72)
Rape/sex offense 1.29** 1.03* 1.08* 0.82 2.37** 1.85*
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.82) (0.81)
Assault 0.76* 0.66 0.95* 0.75 1.72* 1.40*
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.68) (0.66)
Theft 0.05 0.21 -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 0.14
(0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.66) (0.64)
DUI 0.65 0.59 2.04** 1.94** 2.69** 2.53**
(0.54) (0.52) (0.54) (0.53) (0.96) (0.93)
Drugs 0.19 0.36 -0.19 -0.07 -0.01 0.29
(0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.65) (0.64)
Weapons 0.32 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.57 0.87
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.86) (0.85)
Location
Bronx 0.22 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.35 0.32
(0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.53) (0.55)
DC 0.37 0.64** 0.04 0.22 0.41 0.86*
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.41) (0.42)
Phoenix 0.43 0.86** -0.10 0.27 0.32 1.13*
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.51) (0.51)
Jury assistance
Notebook -0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.03
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.39) (0.39)
Written jury 0.12 0.15 -0.21 -0.11 -0.09 0.04
instructions (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.47) (0.47)
Case-level factors, such as case type and location, influenced judges’
perceptions of complexity. For the blended case complexity measure, cases
involving death, drunk driving, rape, and assault were systematically more
complicated for judges. Drunk driving, death, and, to a lesser extent, rape
and assault cases increased legal complexity. (The influence of rape and
assault cases, while important, was sensitive to the inclusion of the trial
length variable.) Judges noted death and rape cases as especially complex
from an evidentiary perspective. Overall, death and rape case types consis-
tently correlated with all three case complexity measures. Location’s 
influence emerged as significant, though inconsistently. Judges reported
increased evidentiary and overall case complexity in Washington, DC and
Phoenix.
Other case-level characteristics—especially those relating to the
number of case participants—also informed judges’ perceptions of case
complexity. Case complexity increased with the total number of defendants,
trial length, and number of expert witnesses, though the expert witness influ-
ence disappeared when the trial days variable was included. In all but one
instance (Column 2), the influence of the total number of defendants
retained its significance even where the number of trials days was included
in the analysis. The number of case participants implicates case complexity
for judges in at least two ways. First, the number of case participants might
simply reflect a case’s underlying complexity. As well, a high number of par-
ticipants might independently contribute to case complexity. Second, insofar
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Table 8: Continued
1 2 3 4 5 6
Evidence Evidence Legal Legal Case Case
Jury permitted to -0.66** -0.63* -0.16 -0.14 -0.82 -0.77
submit written (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.44) (0.43)
questions
Constant 0.00 -0.82 0.34 -0.48 0.34 -1.30
(0.65) (0.65) (0.65) (0.66) (1.16) (1.16)
R2 0.31 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.39 0.46
N 308 282 308 282 308 282
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
NOTE: Dependent variable = judge case complexity ranks using a seven-point Likert scale, with
1 representing “Not at all complex” and 7 representing “Very complex.” Standard errors in
parentheses. Los Angeles is the reference category for the location dummy variables.
SOURCE: NCSC data covering trials at four sites in 2000–2001.
as judges help manage trials, increases in the number of participants pre-
sumably increased judges’ case management burdens.
None of the individual-level factors achieved statistical significance.
Similarly, most (but not all) of the jury-assistance variables also did not
reduce case complexity, at least in the eyes of the presiding judges. Notably,
judges’ assessments of evidentiary (but not legal) complexity declined where
the jury was permitted to submit written questions.
VI. DISCUSSION
Part V summarizes results from case complexity models for juries, attorneys,
and judges. This part considers important themes that emerge across all
three actors at the individual, case, and reform levels, along with the themes’
implications for legal reform.
A. Individual-Level Factors
The findings support my hypothesis that individual-level factors generally
would not influence case complexity. To the extent that demographic back-
ground characteristics were thought to inform case complexity perceptions,
results from this study provide—at best—tepid support. Although a few tra-
ditional demographic characteristics emerged as significant for juries and
attorneys, none are especially robust. Moreover, in two of the three instances,
the coefficient’s direction was unexpected.62
Perceptions of lawyering skills generally did not influence complexity
levels in a consistent or robust manner. Defense attorneys reported that
especially skilled prosecutors reduced case complexity and that highly skilled
defense lawyers increased case complexity. Juries noted only that especially
skilled prosecutors made cases more complex. Prosecutors and judges were
immune to the influence of variation in attorney skill levels.
B. Case-Level Factors
As predicted, certain case-level factors consistently influenced case com-
plexity perceptions. One such case variable, trial length, achieved statistical
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62For example, prior jury experience unexpectedly increased jury case complexity. See Table 6
(Column 1).
significance in every model and for every actor. The trial length variable no
doubt captured an array of factors. Although it is possible to conclude that
trial length itself might make a trial more complicated, a more likely expla-
nation is that complicated criminal cases take longer to litigate.
Complexity levels also varied across case types. Some case types are
more difficult and complicated to litigate than others. Because certain case
types influence, among other outcomes, case disposition time,63 it is plausi-
ble to assume that case types would similarly influence complexity levels. At
one level, the range of case types in this study is bounded because the sample
is limited to criminal cases. Within the subuniverse of criminal cases,
however, important variations exist among case types. Due to the compara-
tively severe penalties involved and, in some instances, problematic proof
problems,64 cases involving death and rape (and sexual assault) should be
more complex than other case types. Indeed, juries, judges, and, to a lesser
extent, attorneys found cases involving death more complex. Despite this
one common thread, other case types affected different actors differently.
When explaining case complexity for juries, difficult evidence matters,
even more than difficult law. Difficult evidence’s salience for juries has been
noted elsewhere and helps explain why some juries hang cases and other
juries reach a verdict.65 Variation in evidentiary difficulty also explains vari-
ation in juror first votes.66 Thus, the hypothesized link between complex evi-
dence and jurors’ perceptions of case complexity is easily understood and
possesses intuitive appeal.
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63Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?, An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 813, 842 tbl. 6 (2000) (finding case type influences civil case disposition
time).
64The massive publicity of the forthcoming rape trial involving NBA basketball star Kobe Bryant
suggests that the prosecution confronts a classic “he said, she said” scenario that will place a
premium on the value of key circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Linda Chavez, Editorial, Ques-
tionable Evidence, Morality in Bryant Case, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 23, 2003, at 19A; T.R. 
Reid, Bryant Faces Tough Law in Colorado Rape Case; Severe Penalties, Sympathetic Juries,
Washington Post, July 26, 2003, at A1; T.R. Reid, Judge Closes Part of Bryant Hearing; 
Accuser’s Medical History at Issue, Washington Post, Jan. 23, 2004, at A3.
65See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 4.
66See Garvey, supra note 45 (finding that the stronger the evidence against the defendant, the
more likely jurors are to vote guilty in the first vote).
One consistent critique leveled against the jury system focuses on
juries’ growing inability to navigate through increasingly complicated cases.67
Results from this study only speak to (and comport with) the foundation for
such a critique. That is to say, results from this study illustrate that juries
reported higher levels of case complexity than attorneys and judges when
viewing the same case. Moreover, for juries, more complicated evidence
made for more complicated cases. Indeed, evidentiary complexity was
among the strongest correlates of jury perceptions of case complexity. At a
descriptive level, then, concerns about juries and complex cases are not 
misplaced. On the other hand, as previously discussed, observed perception
variations might only reflect a scaling effect or, in the alternative, expected
perception differences that reflect the distinctive roles assumed by juries,
attorneys, and judges.68 As well, the results do not speak to whether juries
experienced more difficulty deciding cases they rated as complex.
For juries, the influence of difficult evidence persists despite reform
efforts. The finding implicates the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence in
three ways. First, despite Rule 403,69 difficult evidence continues to reach
juries and to increase jury perceptions of case complexity. Obviously, 
in certain circumstances, the probative value of difficult evidence can out-
weigh its propensity to confuse. Second, the use of expert testimony, per-
mitted under Rule 70270 partly to assist juries in understanding difficult
evidence, might not achieve this goal. Third, an increase in the number of
experts surely increases trial length. And juries found longer trials more
complex.
The findings also reveal a geographic effect on case complexity, likely
owing to salient differences among the four sites included in this study.
Three of the four sampled districts (Los Angeles, the Bronx, and Washing-
ton, DC) have substantial or dominant minority populations. It is conceiv-
able to imagine that minority communities may differ in their makeup and
attitudes in ways that bear on jury perceptions about case complexity. As
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68See Part IV.D.
69Fed. R. Evid. 403 (granting judges discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence due to
prejudice, confusion, or other potential problems).
70Fed. R. Evid. 702.
well, case type compositions varied among the four sites. Owing perhaps to
underlying differences across the four jurisdictions in terms of criminal
conduct and enforcement and prosecutorial policies, courts in the various
sites heard a slightly different mix of cases.71
Scholars increasingly debate the potential influence of geography (or
“locale”) in such other areas as case disposition time, trial outcomes, and
awards.72 Among seasoned litigators, something like a “Bronx effect” is con-
sidered received wisdom.73 Thus, it is not implausible to imagine that geog-
raphy may exert a similar influence on case complexity perceptions. Unlike
for verdicts and damages, however, there is little to be gained from a geo-
graphic tilt in case complexity perceptions. Consequently, a more persuasive
assumption is that nothing systematically distinguishes the four sites in ways
that relate to case complexity perceptions and that location should not exert
a systematic influence.
The findings provide mixed support for the assumption that geogra-
phy does not influence case complexity. On balance, geography’s influence
on case complexity, while present, is neither consistent nor coherent. Juries
reported cases from Washington, DC as more complicated; judges found
cases in Phoenix and Washington, DC more complex. Geography did not
significantly influence attorneys’ perceptions. Overall, a smaller and more
precise point is perhaps more apt: scant evidence emerged that supports 
anything resembling a discernable “Bronx effect.” Whatever influence 
geography exerts on jury decisions, awards, or other outcomes,74 no clear,
consistent, pronounced effect emerged as it relates to case complexity per-
ceptions held by jurors, attorneys, and judges.
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71See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 36 tbl. 3.3.
72See, e.g., Heise, supra note 63, at 839; Arthur S. Hayes, Inner City Jurors Tend to Rebuff Pros-
ecutors and to Back Plaintiffs, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1994, at A1 (finding geography influences
trial outcomes); Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement, supra note 34, at 26 (noting locale’s
influence on judge-jury agreement). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Out-
comes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1839 (2002) (finding little
consistent robust evidence linking demographic factors—including geography—on state trial
outcomes); Mary R. Rose & Neil Vidmar, The Bronx “Bronx Jury”: A Profile of Civil Jury Awards
in New York Counties, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1889 (2002) (finding Bronx awards not to be extreme).
73See, e.g., Roy Grutman et al., Lawyers and Thieves 122–23 (1990); Hayes, supra note 72.
74See sources cited supra note 72.
C. Reform-Level Factors
Increased attention to juries’ perceived weaknesses and inabilities to deal
with increasingly complicated litigation75 as well as reform experiments
designed to assist juries in navigating through complicated cases fuel per-
ceptions that juries require assistance. That jury case complexity was found
to increase the likelihood of a hung jury comports with common percep-
tions.76 As a consequence, in addition to the filtering mechanisms already in
place in evidence rules, various jurisdictions experiment with an array of
jury-assistance mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed, in part, to
reduce case complexity for juries.77 I hypothesized that the jury-assistance
mechanisms would achieve their goals and systematically reduce case com-
plexity for juries as well as (though to a lesser extent) for attorneys and
judges.
The findings do not support my hypothesis. Surprisingly, a loose con-
sensus emerged on the general absence of jury-assistance measures’ influ-
ence (reducing) on jury case complexity.78 None of the assistance efforts
altered either juries’ or attorneys’ perceptions of case complexity. For judges,
the picture is slightly different. Judges perceived a benefit—reducing com-
plexity—from one practice—allowing jurors to submit written questions—
that reduced their perceptions of evidentiary (but not overall case)
complexity.
D. Legal Training
A comparison of attorneys and judges to juries across all three types of vari-
ables suggests that formal legal training may influence case complexity 
perceptions.79 The effect of formal legal training on case complexity 
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76See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 45.
77See, e.g., Penrod & Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense, supra note 19.
78With respect to the efficacy of jury note taking, my findings are consistent with prior empir-
ical work. See id. at 280. The empirical findings on this point are not uniform, however. See,
e.g., Lynne Forster-Lee et al., Effects of Notetaking on Verdicts and Evidence Processing in a
Civil Trial, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 567, 576 (1994) (finding “enhancing qualities” flowing from
jury note taking).
79See Figure 1.
perceptions has been detected in other related contexts. Notably, the NCSC
study of hung jury trials founds that “judges and attorneys do not share the
juries’ perception that the hung jury trials are more complex.”80 Jurors in
cases that hung described those cases as more complicated than cases where
a jury verdict was reached.81 In contrast, attorneys’ and judges’ perceptions
of case complexity did not distinguish cases that hung from cases that
reached a verdict.82
Case complexity models for attorneys and judges more closely resem-
bled each other than either resembled the juries’ case complexity model.
For example, with the sole exception of trial length, none of the trial back-
ground factors informed jury complexity perceptions. In contrast, the
numbers of defendants, victims, and expert witnesses exerted varying levels
of influence on those actors with legal training. Findings on case types dis-
tributed similarly. Only cases that involved death increased complexity for
juries. In contrast, those with legal training (attorneys and judges) reported
that other case types in addition to death cases increased complexity.
E. Implications for Reform
The resulting implications for possible reforms are tentative and indirect, at
best. Although most reforms pivot on an assumption that jurors do not
handle complex cases as well as judges or experts, as previously discussed,
these data speak only to how juries perceive case complexity. Whether and, if
so, how juries handle complex cases differently due partly to differences in
how they perceive case complexity is a critical question not addressed by
these data.
Insofar as some relation exists between differences in juries’ capacity
to handle complex cases and differences in how they perceive case com-
plexity, findings from this study suggest that reforms seeking to blunt threats
to the administration of justice posed by case complexity confront obstacles.
First, the absence of a clear definition of case complexity hinders reform
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80See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 32, at 45.
81Id. at tbl. 4.4. This finding emerges in cases where the jury hangs on any count. Notably,
however, in cases where the jury hangs on all counts, jurors did not perceive the cases as any
less complicated than did attorneys and judges. Id. at 46.
82Id. at 45–46 & tbl. 4.4.
measures.83 For example, if case complexity refers to complicated evidence,
reform measures might dwell on such jury-assistance factors as permitting
jurors to pose questions and receive written instructions from judges. If,
however, case complexity means lengthy trials or trials involving large quan-
tities of material, reform measures might focus on jury note taking. Also, if
juries construe case complexity in terms of processing difficult evidence,
judges might more aggressively exclude such evidence. Put simply, defini-
tional differences may exist among members within each of the three
groups. Further difficulties arise from group differences in case complexity
definitions. Indeed, as previously discussed, juries, attorneys, and judges per-
ceived case complexity differently even when assessing the same case. To be
sure, all three groups, however, share some—albeit limited—common
ground regarding case complexity that might support certain policy meas-
ures. Competing definitions of case complexity, however, render reform
efforts more difficult because different definitions might call for different
reform measures.
Second, many of the factors common to the three groups and corre-
lating with case complexity fall outside of policymakers’ control. For
example, there is little that can effectively reduce the increasingly compli-
cated evidence brought to bear in cases.84 Cases that involve a death, however
complicated they might be for a jury, will still require adjudication and legal
resolution. Further, the background characteristics of individual jurors are
factors that policymakers cannot manipulate without significant constitu-
tional concerns.
Third, factors thought to reduce case complexity that are amenable to
policy manipulation did not significantly ease case complexity. For example,
jury-assistance mechanisms, prompted by reform measures and designed to
reduce case complexity for juries (e.g., permitting jurors to access note-
books, receive written instructions, and submit written questions), did not
reduce complexity for those juries sampled. Indeed, the juries’ assessment
of these mechanisms’ inefficacy was echoed by the attorneys. Only judges
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83See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that trial reforms
aimed at easing burdens from complex cases would benefit from a clear definition of case com-
plexity).
84It may be possible, however, for judges contemplating whether to admit evidence to increase
their attention to the evidence’s potential to confuse. See supra notes 16–18 and accompany-
ing text.
perceived that one measure, enabling jurors to submit written questions,
reduced case complexity.
These findings do not support the strong conclusion that such jury-
assistance mechanisms are inefficacious. The results leave intact the possi-
bility that the jury-assistance mechanisms performed as desired, but that
their effect on juries simply failed to cross the significance threshold.
Another possibility is that the mechanisms may have materially reduced jury
complexity, but that, for juries, the cases remained complicated (only less so
due to the assistance mechanisms). Without the benefit of measures of the
juries’ ex ante baseline level of case complexity absent jury-assistance mech-
anisms, it is impossible to know whether—and if so, to what degree—the
jury-assistance mechanisms performed as desired. What these findings 
do support, however, are calls for further careful study of jury-assistance
measures.
Despite considerable challenges, the news is not all bad. Some steps
might be taken in an effort to reduce case complexity for all involved. For
example, juries, attorneys, and judges all reported longer trials as more com-
plicated. The influence of trial length on case complexity is perhaps the most
consistent and robust finding. Thus, for those judges not already disposed,
renewed efforts to ensure that trial time is efficiently spent might reduce
complexity. Even here, however, causal questions add to the uncertainty. Are
criminal cases complex because they drag on or, in contrast, do intrinsically
more difficult cases simply require more days to present fully? Although it
is likely a combination of both, notably trial length achieved statistical sig-
nificance for juries independent of their perceptions of evidentiary complex-
ity. Thus, it remains at least a possibility that protracted criminal trials serve
as a unique source of case complexity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although jurors and judges may agree much of the time on the outcome of
cases,85 legal actors (that is, juries, attorneys, and judges) do not agree on
what makes criminal cases complex. Not only is this disagreement itself
important, but why they disagree informs as well.
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Despite persisting attention to case complexity—particularly as it bears
on jury capacity—little is known about what makes cases complex for the
major actors in criminal trials. Findings from this study reveal two broad
points. First, juries, attorneys, and judges perceived case complexity slightly
differently, even when assessing the same case. Judges perceived the least
amount of case complexity; juries reported the highest levels. It bears repeat-
ing, however, that what these observed differences imply from a policy per-
spective is far from clear. These differences might mask scaling differences
or how the different actors perceive their different, though complementary,
roles in a criminal trial. Second, also important is that what made cases
complex varied for each group. In general, individual-level factors did not
substantially and consistently influence case complexity. However, certain
case-level factors did correlate, many in the expected direction. Finally,
although it remains possible that reform-level factors—jury-assistance mech-
anisms—may have aided juries, the mechanisms did not systematically
reduce case complexity.
Many of the factors that influenced case complexity are not easily
manipulated. As well, the effectiveness of existing reform measures is
unclear. Jury findings underscore these themes. For juries—the usual focal
point of concerns about case complexity—one case type (death cases), trial
length, difficult evidence, and skillful prosecutors consistently increased jury
perceptions of case complexity. Aside from the dramatic gesture of routing
such case types away from juries and to bench trials (or specialized courts),
these factors are not readily amenable to standard jury reform efforts.
These conclusions are, of course, tentative because the results support
only the most cautious of inferences. Additional empirical research, partic-
ularly efforts that explore the construct of criminal case complexity with
more precision and rigor, would be useful. Researchers will be better posi-
tioned to examine the implications of case complexity once a clearer under-
standing is achieved regarding what the three major groups mean when they
define a case as complex. Insofar as the different groups perceive case com-
plexity differently, reform efforts designed to minimize complexity need to
account for and, perhaps, adjust to, such variation. Findings from this study
supplement a growing empirical foundation that can inform future analyses
of and discussions about case complexity. The findings also suggest that case
complexity is itself more complex than many policymakers assume.
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